Abstract-Code sanitizers are used to automatically detect security vulnerabilities in C/C ++ code that elude static analysis. This requires that the code paths containing the vulnerability are actually executed with sanitization enabled. Under current practice, sanitization is routinely applied when developers perform continuous integration testing and fuzzing of pre-release software. However, sanitization is not commonly enabled in alpha, beta, and final releases of software, with one of the main obstacles being the added run-time overhead.
Introduction
C and C ++ are the languages of choice for systems programmers. These languages allow direct access to hardware, explicit memory management, and high performance-but they lack memory and type safety. Although modern, safe languages could gradually replace C/C ++ , the sheer amount of existing legacy systems code means that, even by optimistic estimates, this replacement could take decades. For the foreseeable future, security researchers have no choice but to focus on preventing memory corruption attacks on software written in unsafe languages.
The past 25 years have yielded a large body of research dedicated to making unsafe languages more secure. Researchers have pursued three mostly orthogonal strategies. First, there exist principled techniques to retrofit C with full spatial [1] , [2] and temporal [3] memory safety. None of these techniques are widely deployed due to compatibility issues and performance concerns. Then, there are exploit mitigations that focus on the prevention of exploitation, rather than the root issue of memory corruption errors. Exploit mitigations are less comprehensive than memory safety approaches but can be applied to live systems without introducing unacceptable performance overheads.
Finally, there are sanitization-based approaches that detect memory corruption errors and other undefined behavior, and attempt to pinpoint the exact locations of vulnerabilities [4] , [5] . Sanitizers focus on the detection of issues rather than on their prevention or mitigation. They rely on heavyweight instrumentation for bookkeeping and detecting such issues. This instrumentation incurs significant overheads, so sanitizers are turned off by default and traditionally used mostly during pre-release continuous integration testing and fuzzing efforts. This is less than ideal because the number of paths executed by test suites and fuzzers is typically far lower than the number of paths that will be executed by end users.
In a recent experiment, the Tor Project released sanitizerenabled (labeled "hardened") builds directly to its users [6] . The hardened build series was discontinued in part due to the high performance overhead and in part due to confusion among end users over which version of the browser best fit their needs. With access to PartiSan, the Tor Project developers could have released builds that by default would automatically adapt the level of sanitization to the capabilities of the target platform, using a conservatively low, adaptive threshold by default (and possibly disabling sanitization completely on underpowered systems) while simultaneously allowing expert users to modify the default settings (thereby also eliminating the need for multiple build versions).
PartiSan works by cloning frequently executed functions at compile time and switching among them efficiently at run time. Each variant can be optimized and protected independently, and thus has different security and performance properties. In the simplest case, one variant is instrumented to sanitize memory accesses while the other one is not. PartiSan supports several configurable run-time partitioning policies that determine which function variant is invoked when a function is called. For example, PartiSan can execute slow variants (e.g., variants with expensive checks) with low probability on frequently executed code paths, and with high probability on rarely executed paths. This policy helps us keep the sanitization overhead below a given threshold. This is superficially similar to the ASAP framework by Wagner et al. [16] insofar that both approaches explore the idea of reducing the amount of sanitization on the hot path. However, ASAP statically partitions the code into parts with/without sanitization based on previous profiling runs at compile time. PartiSan prepares programs for partitioning at compile time but does the partitioning dynamically at run time. This allows us to produce a single binary that adapts to each individual host system, sanitizing as many paths as possible under a given performance budget. Moreover, we can create N different function variants to support N − 1 types of sanitization in a single binary. Table 1 provides an overview of the differences between PartiSan and ASAP.
While we focus our discussion in this paper around sanitizers, we think that there are also worthwhile applications of our framework to profile-guided application of exploit mitigations [7] . (We consider heavyweight, pre-release techniques to be sanitizers, and lightweight, post-deployment techniques to be mitigations.)
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We describe PartiSan 1 , a framework to partition program execution into sanitized/unsanitized (mitigated/unmitigated) fragments at run time. Unlike previous approaches, the partitioning is not static but happens dynamically according to a policydriven, run-time partitioning mechanism which selects the next function variant to execute with low overhead. This lets developers release sanitizerenabled builds to end users and thereby cover more execution paths.
• We present a fully-fledged prototype implementation of our ideas by extending the LLVM compiler infrastructure and explore three concrete run-time partitioning policies. We combined PartiSan with two of LLVM's sanitizers and measured the performance overhead on the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite with our expected-cost partitioning policy. A unique property of our tool is that it never completely removes sanitizer checks, even from frequently executed code. Rather, it ensures that fewer sanitizer checks are performed in frequently executed code.
• We present a thorough evaluation that shows how sanitizers run under our framework still detect the majority of vulnerabilities at performance overheads suitable for deployment on end user systems. For the two popular sanitizers ASan and UBSan, PartiSan reduces overheads by 68% and 76% respectively.
1. PartiSan will be open sourced upon acceptance of this paper.
Background
LLVM [8] , one of the leading industry-strength compiler frameworks, now comes with five different sanitizers. We demonstrate PartiSan by applying two of these sanitizers to a variety of programs. ASan, short for AddressSanitizer [4] , instruments memory accesses and allocation operations to detect a wide range of memory errors, including spatial memory errors such as out-of-bounds accesses and temporal violations such as use-after-free bugs. UBSan, short for UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer [5] , currently detects 22 types of operations whose semantics are undefined [9] by the C standard [10] . UBSan includes checks for integer overflows, uses of uninitialized or unaligned pointers, and undefined integer shifts.
We elected to apply these two sanitizers with PartiSan for two reasons. First, the combination of ASan and UBSan detects many of the vulnerabilities that are deemed critical by the security community. Second, both sanitizers can have their checks applied selectively. Removing any of the sanitization checks from a program does not affect the correct functioning of the remaining checks. This makes these sanitizers a good fit for our framework, in which we selectively skip sanitization checks through run-time partitioning.
Design
We start with a conceptual overview of PartiSan, and then discuss each component in depth.
Overview
Our goal is to reduce the run-time overhead of the sanitizers (and potentially, exploit mitigations) the developer wishes to apply. We do this by creating multiple variants of each function, applying sanitizers to some (but not all) variants, and by embedding a runtime component that partitions the execution of the program into sanitized/unsanitized slices, based on a developer-selected policy. Figure 1 shows an overview of the PartiSan system. To protect an application with PartiSan, the developer must pass the source code of the program to a specialized compiler (left side of Figure 1 ). Depending on which run-time partitioning policy is to be used, the compiler might also require profile data for the program as input. The developer can select the sanitizers and the partitioning policy through the compiler's command line arguments.
The compiler generates an application with multiple variants for each function. In our current design, we create two such variants. One of the variants, which we refer to as the unsanitized variant, does not include any sanitizer checks, and therefore resembles the function that would have been generated by an unmodified compiler. The other variant, which we call the sanitized variant, incorporates all of the developer-selected sanitizer checks.
The compiler modifies the program's control flow accordingly: rather than calling function variants directly, the The runtime currently supports three partitioning policies: random partitioning, profile-guided partitioning, and expected-cost partitioning. With the random partitioning policy, the runtime randomly selects the active variants, whereas the profile-guided and expected-cost partitioning policies select active variants with a probability that depends on the hotness and/or expected sanitization cost of that function. These policies can help us limit the overall cost of sanitization.
Creating Function Variants
PartiSan's compiler pass runs after the source code is parsed and converted into intermediate representation (IR) code. As its first step (Step 1 in Figure 1 ), our compiler pass analyzes the IR code and determines which functions to create variants for. We do not necessarily create variants for each function. If the developer selects the profile-guided or expected-cost partitioning policy, and if the profile data indicates that a function is infrequently executed, then we create only the sanitized variant for that function. This design choice prevents PartiSan from unnecessarily inflating the code size of the protected program and is justified because checks in infrequently executed code have little impact on the program's overall performance.
Then, PartiSan creates the variants in two steps ( 2 ). First, we clone functions that should have two variants and give them new, unique names. Then, we apply the requested transformations to the variants. Depending on which protection should be applied, we have two strategies to apply transformations:
Apply the protection only to the sanitized variants.. This is our default and preferred strategy. It only works for protections that can be applied on a per-function basis. One example of such a protection is ASan, which can be applied to functions by marking them with a functionlevel IR attribute.
Apply the protection to all variants and subsequently remove it from the unsanitized variant.. This strategy can be used for two purposes. First, it can be used to apply protections that cannot be applied to individual functions, but must instead be applied to an entire translation unit. Second, it can be used to apply sanitizers that must maintain metadata. Removing the functionality that maintains metadata from the unsanitized variants might break the sanitizer checks performed in the sanitized variants. When using this strategy, we apply the protection uniformly across the entire translation unit, and then run a secondary pass later in the compilation pipeline to remove the checks from the unsanitized variants.
3.2.1. Limitations. Not all protections will work with PartiSan. Like ASAP, PartiSan does not support protections that do not function correctly if they are selectively applied. Consider, for example, a multithreaded program compiled with ThreadSanitizer [11] . If two functions in the program concurrently write to the same memory location without acquiring a lock, then ThreadSanitizer will detect a data race. This would not be true in a PartiSan-enabled version of the program, if we executed the sanitized variant of one function and the unsanitized variant of the other. In this case, the data race would not be detected, thus rendering ThreadSanitizer ineffective.
Creating the Indirection Layer
Once we have created the function variants, our compiler pass creates the indirection layer, through which we route all of the program's function calls. Using this layer, we can ensure that the program can only call the active variant of each function. Our indirection layer consists of three components: the variant pointer array (right side of Figure 1 ), trampolines for externally reachable functions, and controlflow instructions that read their target from the pointer array.
Our compiler starts by embedding the variant pointer array into the application ( 3 ). The pointer array contains one slot for each function that has multiple variants. Each slot contains a pointer to the entry point of the currently active variant of that function.
Then, we create trampolines for all functions ( 4 ). A trampoline jumps to the currently active variant of its associated function. We assign the original name of the associated function to the trampoline. This way, we ensure that any call that targets the original function now calls the trampoline, and consequently, the currently active variant of the original function instead.
Finally, we transform all direct call instructions that target functions with multiple variants into indirect controlflow instructions that read the pointer to the active variant of the target function from the pointer array ( 5 ). This optimization eliminates the need to route direct calls within the program through the function trampolines. However, the trampolines may still be called through indirect call instructions, or by external code.
Embedding Metadata
Our compiler embeds read-only metadata describing each function and its variants into the application ( 6 ). The metadata consists of the function execution frequencies read from the profile data, the estimated execution costs for all function variants, and information connecting each slot in the variant pointer array to the variant entry points associated with that slot. Our partitioning mechanism uses the metadata to make its run-time decisions.
The PartiSan Runtime
Our runtime implements the developer-selected partitioning policy by periodically activating and deactivating variants. While a specific variant is active, none of the other variants of that same function can be called. To activate a variant, our runtime writes a pointer to that variant's entry point into the appropriate slot in the pointer array. PartiSan offloads its partitioning mechanism to a background thread. This allows us to implement a variety of partitioning policies that do not slow down the application thread(s). Operating as a background thread also allows our runtime to run frequently, and thus make fine-grained partitioning decisions.
Our runtime currently implements three concrete partitioning policies.
Random Partitioning.. With this policy, our runtime component activates a randomly selected variant of each function whenever our thread wakes up. Since we only generate two variants of each function, this policy divides the execution time evenly among the sanitized/unsanitized function variants.
Profile-Guided Partitioning.. With this policy, our runtime component collects the list of functions with multiple variants in the program, and orders this list based on the functions' execution counts (as recorded in the profile data input to the compiler). Our runtime activates the sanitized variant of a function with a probability that is inversely proportional to its order in the execution count list. The sanitized variant of the most frequently executed function is activated with 1% probability, and that of the least frequently executed function with a 100% probability. Note that this partitioning policy does not estimate the overhead impact of executing a sanitized variant instead of an unsanitized variant. It also does not consider the absolute execution count of a function. For example, the second least executed function in a program with 100 functions is sanitized 99% of the time, even if its execution count is 1000 times higher than that of the least executed function.
Expected-Cost Partitioning.. This policy improves upon the profile-guided partitioning policy by calculating sanitization probabilities based on function execution counts (read from the profile data) and estimated sanitization cost. We estimate the cost of sanitization for each function by calculating the costs of all function variants using LLVM's Cost Model Analysis. We then calculate the probability of activating the sanitized variant for a function using formula:
The sanitization overhead budget is chosen by the developer and is evenly distributed among the functions in the program.
Implementation
Our prototype implementation of PartiSan targets x86-64 Linux applications compiled with clang/LLVM. Our design, however, is fully generalizable to other operating systems, compilers, and architectures.
Profiling
Two of our run-time partitioning policies rely on profile data to calculate the sanitization probabilities. We use LLVM's built-in profiling functionality to generate binaries that output profile data.
Compiler Pass
We implemented the PartiSan compiler pass in LLVM 3.9 [8] . Our pass instruments the program code at the LLVM IR level processing one translation unit at a time. PartiSan is fully compatible with standard build systems and program loaders. We installed our pass into the compiler pipeline to run right after the LLVM function inliner. This way it does not interfere with inlining, but still profits from LLVM's later optimization stages.
Creating Function Variants.
Of the sanitizers that come with LLVM, our pass currently supports ASan and UBSan. We did not modify any sanitizer code and most of PartiSan's code is tool-agnostic. To create the function variants, we begin by passing the necessary -fsanitize command line options to the compiler. ASan's front-end pass prepares the program by marking all functions that require sanitization with a function-level attribute. With just one line of ASan-specific code, PartiSan removes this function attribute for the unsanitized variants. UBSan's frontend pass embeds many of its checks before the program is translated into IR. PartiSan contains 56 lines of code responsible for removing these checks from the unsanitized variants.
4.2.2.
Creating the Indirection Layer. PartiSan routes function calls through an indirection layer. This layer ensures that the program can only call the active variant of each function. We create the indirection layer as follows. We begin by collecting the set of functions for which we have created multiple variants. Then, we add the variant pointer array as a global variable with internal linkage. We choose the size of the array such that it has one slot for every function in the set. Next, we create trampolines for all functions in the set. The trampoline, which takes over the name of the function it corresponds to, forwards control to the currently active variant of that function. By taking over the name of the original function, the trampoline ensures that any calls to that function will be routed to the currently active variant.
Next, we replace all call instructions that may target functions in the set with indirect call instructions that read their call target from the variant pointer array. Functions outside the compilation unit will not be in the set, but might still have multiple variants. While we do not replace calls to such instructions, the call will still (correctly) invoke the currently active variant of the target function because it will be routed through that function's trampoline.
Note that the compiled program will only contain the trampolines that may actually be used at run time. If a trampoline's corresponding function is not externally visible (and thus may be called by external code) and it does not have its address taken (e.g., by a virtual function call instruction), then the trampoline will be deleted by LLVM's dead code elimination pass. Figure 2 shows the assembly code that is generated for the trampolines and modified call sites. Note that, since we apply PartiSan to individual compilation units, there might be multiple variant pointer arrays and function descriptor arrays in the program. Rather than forcing our runtime to find the locations of all of these arrays, we explicitly pass the array locations to the runtime during program startup. We do this by generating a constructor function for each module. We add this constructor function to the binary's .init_array section, so it is automatically invoked when the program interpreter loads our program. The constructor function is responsible for registering the module with our runtime.
Embedding
Metadata. Our runtime component needs to know which function variants are associated with each slot of the variant pointer array. Depending on which partitioning policy our runtime enforces, it may also require function execution frequencies collected during profiling, and estimated execution costs for all function variants. We add this information as read-only data to each compilation unit. Specifically, we add an array of function descriptors to each unit. The definition of a function descriptor is shown in Listing 1. The layout of the function descriptor array mirrors that of the variant pointer array.
The PartiSan Runtime
We link the PartiSan runtime into the final executable. We implemented three different versions of our runtime, one for each of the partitioning policies described in Section 3.5. The runtime exposes a single externally visible function used to register modules, as explained above: void register(func_t * fns, uintptr_t * rand_ptrs, uint32_t f_count). Every To initialize the runtime, we add yet another constructor function to the program. This constructor initializes the runtime's data structures and starts the randomizing background thread. We assign the lowest possible priority to the runtime's constructor, so it is guaranteed to run after all of the modules have registered.
The runtime's initialization proceeds in four steps. First, the runtime computes the activation probabilities for each function variant, as described in Section 3.5. Depending on which policy the runtime enforces, these activation probabilities may be random, or based on the function execution counts and/or expected variant costs. Then, we seed a secure number generator. Next, we initialize all of the variant pointer arrays in the program, which must be done from the constructor because the program might call some of the variant functions before our runtime's background thread performs its first round of run-time partitioning. Finally, we spawn the background thread that is responsible for the continuous run-time partitioning. The background thread runs an infinite loop which repeatedly invokes the partitioning function, followed by a call to nanosleep. The sleep time can be configured via an environment variable and defaults to 100 ns. 4.3.1. Run-time Partitioning. Our background thread executes a partitioning function whenever it wakes up. This function iterates through the function descriptors and variant pointer arrays for every registered module. For every function, we generate a random integer number X between 0 and 100, and use this to select one of the variants. If the activation probabilities for the sanitized and unsanitized variants of a function are 1 and 99 % respectively, then we will activate the sanitized variant if X is less than 2, and we will activate the unsanitized variant for values above 1. We write the pointer to the activated variant in the variant pointer array.
We attempt to reduce cache contention by performing the write only if necessary, i.e., only if the old and new value differ. This adds a read dependency on the old pointer value which may slow down the background thread. However, the execution of the background thread is not performance critical since it runs fully asynchronously with respect to the application thread(s).
PartiSan Configuration
PartiSan provides a number of command line options to customize the compiler pass and runtime. Table 2 lists the supported options.
PartiSan's policy configuration options allow the developer to fine-tune the predefined policies or create completely new ones on a per-application basis. The first three options enable PartiSan, select the sanitizers to apply, and specify the location of the profile data. Options 1 and 2 are standard LLVM options.
The next three options influence which functions we create variants for at compile time. With Option 3, we create variants for all functions whose execution count exceeded the min-exec-count. Option 4 depends on the function execution counts recorded in the profile data. For this we use LLVM's built-in cost model to classify functions as cold, normal, or hot. We then have the option to create variants of all functions, of all functions except those that are cold, and of only the hot functions. Similarly, Option 5 distinguishes functions based on how they access memory. This becomes important when we consider PartiSan's interaction with different sanitizers. For example, when using ASan it makes little sense to create variants for a function that does not access memory.
The next two options allow us to specify the runtime functions which calculate the variant activation probabilities, and which activate variants respectively. These options allow us to implement all three of our partitioning policies within the same runtime library. Developers may also opt to define their own custom policy by linking in replacements for the two aforementioned functions.
Lastly, Option 8 defines the delay between rounds of partitioning on the background thread (in nanoseconds).
Effectiveness
We evaluate the effectiveness of PartiSan with an empirical investigation of five CVEs [12] , including the infamous Heartbleed bug. Table 3 shows the CVEs we tested. Each of them was found in a popular real-world program and the types of vulnerabilities include stack-based overflows and information leaks on the heap. We used PartiSan to compile two versions of each program, applying ASan to the sanitized variants in one version and UBSan in the other version, and we configured our runtime to enforce its expected-cost partitioning policy. We detected four out In step 2, we compile the program with ASan or UBSan enabled, but without PartiSan. We run our test script from step 1 to verify that the vulnerability is detected by the sanitizer.
Our run-time partitioning policy requires profile data, so in step 3, we use LLVM's built-in profiling facilities to create an instrumented version of the program for collecting profile data. We use the tests that come with the program as the profiling workload. For vulnerabilities in submodules/extensions, we only run the tests of the submodule to increase the chance of the vulnerable code being classified as hot (since vulnerabilities in cold code are guaranteed to be detected). The test suite of the vulnerable OpenSSL version does not cover the Heartbeat extension. Therefore, if we run the the test suite as-is, the function that contains the Heartbleed vulnerability is never executed. PartiSan would therefore classify this function as cold and always sanitize it, which guarantees detection. To be more conservative, we executed the vulnerable function 300 times with benign input alongside the official test suite.
Next, in step 4, we compile the program with the sanitizer enabled under PartiSan. We use PartiSan's default configuration (as shown in Table 2 ) to compile each of the programs. This means that the protected program contains two variants of all functions, except those that are cold and those without memory accesses. We only created sanitized variants for cold functions, and unsanitized variants for functions without memory accesses.
Finally, we execute our test script from step 1 a 1000 times to measure the detection rate.
Out of the five vulnerabilities, ASan and UBSan detect four and three respectively. The three vulnerabilities detected by UBSan all involve an integer overflow, e.g., the program wrongly interprets a negative integer as unsigned. The overflown value usually represents the length of some buffer, which, after the overflow, allows out-ofbounds buffer accesses. The other two vulnerabilities are caused by a lack of bounds checking. Note that although the last CVE is classified as a heap over-read, ASan does not detect it. The reason is that the Python interpreter manages its own memory. It requests large chunks of memory from the operating system and maintains its own free lists to serve individual requests. Unfortunately, ASan treats each chunk as a single allocation and therefore is unable to detect overflows within a chunk. This shows that there is value in using multiple sanitizers that can detect different causes of vulnerabilities.
Lastly, we want to note that three out of five vulnerabilities are in code that PartiSan classifies as cold. For those cases, we manually verified that PartiSan only created the sanitized variant for the vulnerable functions. Hence, those vulnerabilities are always reported. This result supports PartiSan's underlying assumption that most bugs hide in infrequently executed code. Overall, our results show that we always detect bugs in cold code while bugs in hot code are detected probabilistically. We argue that this is a valuable property in our envisioned usage scenario: finding bugs in beta software during real usage with an acceptable performance overhead.
Evaluation
We evaluated the performance of PartiSan programs using the SPEC CPU2006 [13] integer benchmark suite. Since PartiSan clones code we also measure the size of the resulting binaries. Memory overheads-a small constant amount for the background thread and a few bytes of metadata for every function-are negligible (< 1%) for all SPEC programs, so we do not show them.
We conducted all experiments on a host equipped with an Intel Xeon E5-2660 CPU and 64 GB of RAM running 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04. We applied ASan and UBSan to all of the benchmark programs. We configure UBSan to disable error recovery, which always aborts the program instead of printing a warning message and attempting to recover for a subset of failed checks. For configurations including UBSan we also set create-variants-bymemory-access=all, which instructs PartiSan to create variants of all functions, even those that do not access the memory. We use the expected-cost partitioning policy with a sanitization budget of 1%, which our runtime evenly divides across all functions. For all other PartiSan options we use the defaults from Table 2 .
To collect profile data we use LLVM's built-in profiling facilities on the training workload of SPEC. Since PartiSan relies on profile data to achieve good performance, we make the same data available to the baseline configuration to guarantee a fair comparison. We compile all configurations, including the baseline, with profile-guided optimization enabled, supplying the same profile data for all configurations. When measuring the runtime we use the reference workload, run each benchmark three times, and report the median. Figure 3 and 4 show the run time overheads for ASan and UBSan with respect to the baseline for all SPEC integer benchmarks. The last column depicts the geometric mean over all benchmarks, which is additionally stated in percent by Table 4 for easier reference.
Performance
If we apply PartiSan without sanitizers, it incurs 2% overhead on average, with a maximum of 9% for gobmk. We have identical variants for all functions in this configuration.
For the fully-sanitized versions of ASan and UBSan (applied without PartiSan) we measured an average overhead of 103% and 59% respectively. Note that the maximum overhead introduced by ASan is a staggering 289% for perlbench.
We also created a version of ASan that does not execute any checks. The remaining overhead can be attributed to maintaining metadata and other bookkeeping tasks. This configuration represents a lower bound on the run time achievable by PartiSan since bookkeeping needs to be done in all variants. PartiSan stays close to this lower bound for many benchmarks even when using the expected-cost policy (instead of a tuned policy for each program). For the PartiSan-enabled versions of ASan and UBSan we measured an average overhead of 33% and 14% respectively. This corresponds to a reduction of overhead levels by more than two thirds (68% and 76%) with respect to the fully-sanitized versions. We also include a configuration that enables both ASan and UBSan in Figure 4 to show that PartiSan can handle multiple mitigations tools as long as those tools are compatible with each other. Table 5 shows the total size of SPEC benchmark binaries in kilobytes. We state binary sizes for ASan and UBSan with and without PartiSan and the size increase in percent.
Binary Size
The linking of the PartiSan runtime into each binary adds a constant overhead of 6 KB. Internally, our runtime depends on the pthread library to run as a background thread. However, this does not increase program size since libpthread is a shared library.
For ASan, the increase in relative code size is dominated by the inclusion of the ASan runtime. This is due to SPEC benchmarks being relatively small programs. Therefore the larger programs in the suite, i.e., gcc and xalancbmk, show the highest increase percentage wise. We argue that (using our policy) the maximum increase in binary size is limited by a factor of two. In this worst case, PartiSan would classify all code as hot and create variants for all functions in the program. The other configurations, that is, UBSan and ASan+UBSan (not shown), have size characteristics analogous to ASan. Table 6 gives a better overview of the impact that PartiSan has on binary size for real-world programs. We show the binary sizes of the three programs used in our effectiveness evaluation again for both ASan and UBSan. Note that we can use the min-exec-count configuration option to navigate the size-performance trade-off. If binary size is a priority, the developer may also define a custom, size-conservative policy.
Discussion
Exploit Mitigations. While we see the enablement of broader application of sanitizers as the main purpose h m m e r s j e n g l i b q u a n t u m h 2 6 4 r e f o m n e t p p a s t a r x a l a n c b m k g e o m e a n of PartiSan, we believe it could be used to deploy exploit mitigations too. Specifically, PartiSan could lower the overhead incurred by expensive exploit mitigations by making their checks probabilistic. This could especially help to stop the unbridled replication of worms. Worms often manage to infect a great number of systems before they are detected. They can do this because their targets have unknown vulnerabilities and are only protected by exploit mitigations that have limited performance impact. PartiSan could apply stronger exploit mitigations to programs, which would enable them to detect at least a fraction of the worm attacks. This would greatly increase the chance of worms being detected early. When using PartiSan as a framework for exploit mitigation, we naturally have to consider PartiSan's impact on the attack surface of the program. In this scenario, PartiSan's variant pointer array becomes an interesting attacker target. Although this array is stored on read-only pages, we have to make it writable to run the run-time partitioning function. This means that there is a time window where an attacker could forcibly enable the unsanitized/unprotected function variants. PartiSan could be combined with Software Fault Isolation-based techniques to protect the pointer array from such attacks [14] .
Custom Partitioning Policies. We implemented three run-time partitioning policies in PartiSan. Our random partitioning policy can be used to defend against side-channel attacks. Our profile-guided and expected-cost policies can apply sanitizers at a greatly reduced cost. The flexibility of our design and implementation can enable developers to easily implement their own policies.To implement a custom partitioning policy, the developer only needs to add a load_policy and an activate_variant function to our runtime's code. This policy can then be enabled by passing the names of the new functions to the compiler as command line options (see Table 2 ).
Background Thread. We opted to implement our runtime partitioning functionality using a background thread. The advantage of our approach is that, since partitioning happens asynchronously relative to the rest of the application, our runtime component by itself has little impact on the application's performance. The disadvantage is that we cannot partition on a per-function call basis.
Limitations
Partitioning Granularity. PartiSan partitions the program run time at function-level granularity. This design decision can have a visible impact on the run-time performance and responsiveness of the protected application. In particular, PartiSan might execute the sanitized variant of a hot function containing a long-running loop. Executing this sanitized variant can induce a noticeable slowdown as PartiSan does not support control-flow transfers between sanitized and unsanitized variants within the same function. Our design can support finer-grained partitioning, though a significant engineering effort would be required to implement it. Our fundamental conclusions would not change with an improved partitioning scheme.
Related Work

Run-Time Partitioning
PartiSan is not the first tool to achieve significant runtime overhead reductions for exploit mitigations and/or sanitizers through run-time partitioning. Kurmus and Zippel proposed to create a split kernel with a protected partition containing a hardened variant of each kernel function, and an unprotected partition containing non-hardened variants [15] . Whenever the kernel services a system call or an interrupt request, it transfers control flow to one of the two partitions. The protected partition is used to service requests from untrusted processes and devices, and vice versa. Contrary to PartiSan, however, does not permit control flow transfers between the two partitions. A service request is handled in its entirety by one of the two partitions.
The ASAP framework, presented by Wagner et al., reduces sanitizer overhead by applying sanitizer checks only to infrequently executed code, while leaving the frequently executed code unaffected [16] . This is also a form of partitioning, as ASAP creates a sanitized and an unsanitized partition within the program. As with PartiSan, control flow transfers between sanitized and unsanitized code are frequent with ASAP. However, contrary to PartiSan and the aforementioned work, ASAP never creates multiple variants of a function. ASAP should therefore be considered a static form of partitioning.
Profile-Guided Exploit Mitigation
Our profile-guided approach is motivated by previous research that trades security for performance depending on the hotness of code [7] , [16] .
Homescu et al. propose profile-guided automated software diversity to minimize diversification overhead [7] . They selectively insert NOP instructions based on basic blocks execution frequencies. With the assistance of profiling information, they greatly reduce performance overhead, while securing programs against code reuse attacks.
Wagner et al. rely on profiling information to estimate the cost of sanity checks and select a subset of the available sanity checks that fit within the specified overhead budget [16] .
These approaches share the same underlying idea to restrain hardening efforts in hot code for performance, while preserving security properties in cold code, which corresponds to our run-time partitioning strategies.
Our framework, however, provides more flexibility in the decision of security and performance trade-offs, by selecting the function variants to execute at run time. The previous approaches, however, make all the decisions at compile time.
Sanitizers
We applied PartiSan to two of the sanitizers that are part of the LLVM compiler framework, AddressSanitizer [4] and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer [5] . Many other sanitizers exist. Some of them could potentially be used with PartiSan too.
ThreadSanitizer (TSan) instruments memory accesses and atomic operations to detect data races, deadlocks, and misuses of thread synchronization primitives (e.g., pthread mutexes) in multithreaded programs [11] . Unfortunately, TSan is not a good fit for PartiSan because its checks cannot be applied selectively, as we argued in Section 3.2.1.
MemorySanitizer (MSan) detects reads of uninitialized values and, although we did not include it in our evaluation, it is fully compatible with PartiSan [17] .
CaVer [18] and TypeSan [19] detect type confusion bugs in C ++ programs by detecting downcasts of a base class pointer into an illegal derived class pointer. Although we did not test them, both sanitizers could potentially be applied with PartiSan.
HexVASan detects misuses of variadic arguments [20] . HexVASan detects cases where a variadic function attempts to retrieve more arguments than were passed by the caller, or where the function casts a variadic argument into a different type than the one used at the call site. HexVASan is also a potential candidate for application with PartiSan.
Exploit Mitigations
While our main focus is on sanitizers, PartiSan could potentially be applied to exploit mitigations as well. PartiSan could, for example, significantly reduce the run-time overhead of always-on exploit mitigations such as fine-grained Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [21] , [22] , [23] by turning them into probabilistic mitigations. As is the case with sanitizers, not all exploit mitigations could be applied by PartiSan, as some mitigations cannot be applied selectively. However, since most implementations of CFI are stateless, they are ideal candidates for application with PartiSan.
Memory Safety
PartiSan could also apply memory safety techniques with reduced overhead. Memory safety mechanisms can generally have their checks be applied selectively. However, depending on how these mechanisms store and propagate metadata, a lot of engineering effort may be required to separate the safety checks from the metadata management instructions. Safety checks can be applied probabilistically by PartiSan without affecting the correctness of other safety checks. Metadata management instructions, however, must always be executed. We therefore suspect that memory safety techniques with object-based metadata management can be applied by PartiSan with little to no effort [2] , [24] , [25] , [26] , because such schemes do not need to propagate metadata through pointer assignments. Techniques with pointer-based metadata management will likely require a significant amount of effort to include in PartiSan [1] , [3] , [27] , [28] .
Control-Flow Diversity
PartiSan partitions the run time of the protected program using control-flow diversity. Prior work has explored the use of control-flow diversity for security purposes. One such work, Isomeron [29] , is a defensive technique that defeats just-in-time return-oriented-programming (JIT-ROP) attacks [30] . JIT-ROP attacks are similar to regular ROP attacks [31] in that they repeatedly execute existing small code snippets (gadgets) in the program. Contrary to regular ROP attacks that discover the locations of these gadgets offline, however, JIT-ROP attacks find gadgets on-the-fly and on the target system itself. Isomeron prevents such attacks by creating diversified clones of the program's functions and by switching randomly between functions on every function call and return statement. Even with precise knowledge of the gadget locations, an attacker cannot mount a reliable JIT-ROP attack against Isomeron, as Isomeron might transfer control flow to a non-intended location after every execution of a gadget.
Crane et al. [32] describe how they used control-flow diversity to mitigate cache-based side-channel attacks. Sidechannel attacks exploit the fact that some resources are shared across logical isolation boundaries like processes and virtual machines. In general, an adversary tries to infer sensitive information (or influence the execution) of another logical entity by observing (or inducing) leakage present in the shared resource. One such type of a leaking resource are the caches placed at different levels throughout the memory hierarchy. During a cache side-channel attack an adversary measures timing differences in his own memory accesses (cache hit versus cache miss) to observe the location of memory accesses in the target program. Based on the observed memory access pattern and armed with a detailed understanding of the target program the adversary can attempt to infer sensitive information. Crane et al. mitigate these attacks by creating multiple variants of program functions and applying different diversifying transformations to each variant. The transformations are designed to preserve the semantics of the code, but obscure the code's memory access patterns (i.e., data access locations and execution trace). Essentially, the technique adds noise to the observable leakage in the shared cache, which raises the difficulty for the adversary.
Conclusion
A lot of effort is going into writing sanitizers that help developers find and eliminate programming errors before releasing software to end users. Unfortunately, sanitizers are only as effective as the number of code paths that are executed during testing. Fuzzing and test suites only cover a small fraction of all possible paths. One way to increase coverage is to release sanitizer-enabled builds to testers. This is not common practice today, because dealing with sanitizer-enabled builds isn't easy. First, sanitization often adds substantial overheads that might overwhelm low-end systems. Second, while there might be plenty of users with higher-end systems (that can tolerate the overhead) who might be willing to participate in such testing efforts in principle, the current need to explicitly choose sanitizer-enabled builds over regular ones is cumbersome and confusing and likely to lead to low participation rates.
Our approach, PartiSan, addresses both of these problems by letting developers ship a single sanitizer-enabled binary without having to commit to either the fraction of time spent sanitizing on a given target, nor the type of sanitization employed. Specifically, PartiSan uses runtime partitioning controlled by tunable policies. We have explored three simple policies and expect future developers to define additional, application and domain-specific ones. Our experiments show that, using our expected-cost policy, PartiSan reduces performance overheads of the two popular sanitizers, ASan and UBSan, by 68% and 76% respectively.
Hence, PartiSan is able to extend the usage scenarios of sanitizers to a much wider group of testers and their respective program inputs, leading to the exploration of a greater number of program paths. This will enable developers to catch more errors early, reducing the number of vulnerabilities in released software.
